



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THE RECENT WAR WITH SPAIN
FROM AN HISTORICAL POINT
OF VIEW. ~ BERNARD MOSES.



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FROM AN HISTORICAL POINT
OF VIEW. ↞ BERNARD MOSES,¹⁸⁴⁶⁻¹⁹³⁰
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THE RECENT WAR WITH SPAIN FROM AN HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW.*

By BERNARD MOSES.

In discussing the historical significance of the recent war with Spain, I am conscious of the difficulties in the way of reaching satisfactory judgments concerning great events that lie partly in the experience of the immediate past. We know less about this conflict than the scholars of the next generation will know. Its significance, like the significance of any important contemporary social movement, is not yet unfolded, and consequently no man may read it. Whatever judgment is rendered to-day touching the late war between the United States and Spain is only such a judgment as may be revealed by the light of the history of these two nations; and in this light the struggle appears as a phase of the centuries-old conflict that has arisen from antagonistic national qualities and divergent national policies.

This English and Spanish rivalry has sometimes led to brilliant and romantic exploits, but oftener it has held the two peoples in a state of mutual indifference and contempt. Though sometimes latent, this antagonism has never been subdued in either party. In the days of the great Armada it manifested itself on the part of Spain in a theatrical undertaking to crush the English nation and to drive the

*An address at a meeting of the Teachers' Association of Northern California, October 27, 1899.

English flag from the seas. But the wrecks of the proud fleet littered the shores of Northern Europe, and the standard of England continued to be carried over the ocean without permission from Spain. In the same spirit, in the last half of the eighteenth century, the Spaniards, in possession of Louisiana, undertook to close the mouth of the Mississippi against the settlers of English stock who were laying the foundations of civilization in the West. Later, on the plains of Texas, there was hostility when the presence of the two peoples led to inevitable conflict. And finally, in the West Indies, has come the last phase of the contest.

The ultimate outcome of this conflict was long ago foreshadowed by the fate of France in her rivalry, on this continent, with men of English blood. The long struggle for supremacy in America between the English and the French peoples began with the beginning of the period of discovery and settlement. Decade after decade the French and English pioneers penetrated the wilderness and claimed lands for their respective sovereigns. The great prize to be won was the Valley of the Mississippi. It was the opportunity of a nation's life-time, and it presented no chance for compromise. Before the tribunal of force the cause went against France, and she withdrew from the western continent. In 1762 she surrendered all her vast possessions in America. The result of all her colonial enterprises, of the sacrifice and daring of her subjects, passed from her forever.

The fate of France has been repeated in the misfortunes of Spain. Here two nations, the French and the Spanish, have been obliged to relinquish participation in the greatest undertaking, and to renounce the greatest opportunities, of modern times; and it was the English people in both cases before whose advance they withdrew. In both cases the English stock won. In both cases, moreover, power remained with the colonies of large local independence, while those closely bound to the central authority of the

parent state were overcome and passed under foreign dominion.

As it regards the Spanish possessions, what has been accomplished through the recent war with Spain is to end a movement begun in 1810, when all of the Spanish colonies on the American continent asserted their wish to be emancipated from Spain. The earlier phase of the movement for Spanish colonial emancipation had its origin in the ideas of political liberty generated in the English colonies; ideas that stirred our fathers to demand their independence from the mother country, and moved them to risk whatever was dearest to achieve that independence. For it was the ideas born in the thirteen English colonies that formed the spiritual ground and inspiration of the French revolution; and from France and the United States went forth the doctrines that incited the Spanish colonies to begin a struggle for freedom. From Mexico to Buenos Ayres the war for emancipation filled the land with tumult and confusion for fourteen years. Finally, with the last overthrow of Spanish authority in Peru, in 1824, the independent nations of Spanish America were brought into being. It was the ideas, the spiritual power developed in the United States, that had set them free.

Thus, influence proceeding from the United States, put forth through ideas that have formed the basis of our political life, caused Spain to withdraw from continental America. If this were the whole story, Spain's defeat in her first encounter with her rebellious American colonies would be in the highest degree pathetic; but the sympathy of the world is in some degree checked by the thought that the fundamental causes of Spain's decline lie in her own character and conduct.

Spain failed in this first encounter because she was proud, and in her pride underestimated all persons not born within the limits of her European dominions. In spite of all their traditions and the purity of their blood, men born in Spanish America were counted unworthy of

the king's confidence, and unfit for the higher offices in the colonies. Hardly more than one per cent. of the highest officers in Spain's American possessions were born in America. With few exceptions they were born in Spain, educated in Spain, and brought to America the Spaniard's low opinion of those who constituted the bulk of the society of the colonies. This low opinion on the part of the governors grew into contempt, and the consequent resentment of the colonists grew into hostility to the government. Thus was established an antagonism which increased with the growth of population and made reconciliation impossible. And in this antagonism we discover one of the causes of the earlier war for Spanish-American independence and the overthrow of Spanish authority on this continent.

Spain failed because she was greedy of wealth, and in her greed undertook to contravene the normal operation of economic forces. She explored and settled a large part of the territory of America, and endeavored to make this vast region render tribute only to Spain. By an elaborate system of laws the trade between Spain and her colonies was subject to intolerable monopolies and strangling restrictions; and trade between the colonies themselves was prohibited. Under this system Spanish colonists in America were unable to obtain wares from Europe except at prices that were almost prohibitive; and the government lent the strength of its authority to support these grinding exactions. Under this system the Spanish colonists found advantage in trade only where the laws were broken, and trade was carried on with the smugglers from other countries. They opposed the Spanish policy because it ran counter to their interests. The industrial and commercial restraints with which Spain hampered the economical development of her American colonies constituted a standing grievance, and under the influence of this policy of commercial jealousy "her population declined, her manufactories were ruined, her merchant marine ceased to

exist, her capital was diminished, foreigners carried on her commerce by smuggling, and all the gold and silver of the New World found their way to other countries than Spain." By centuries of unreasonable discrimination and unjust restriction Spain had forfeited her parental rights, and emancipation was the inevitable step forward.

Spain failed because of her moral weakness, through which the nation was prevented from raising an effective voice in condemnation of official corruption. When the opportunities of political office are used for personal gain rather than for the fulfillment of a patriotic duty, the foundations of a state are indeed insecure. A nation that is rich, even in this condition of affairs, may stand many years; but Spain was poor, and early suffered the ruin that, ultimately, in spite of wealth or power, follows the overthrow of public morality.

Spain failed because she was intolerant, and in her intolerance made religious belief the test of good citizenship. In the earlier centuries the Jews and the Moors were unable to meet this test and were driven out of Spain. Thereby the nation suffered an irretrievable loss of commercial and financial ability; and the Spaniards were, therefore, obliged to face the difficult problems of their colonial undertaking with little financial ability and less commercial sagacity. The empire which they constructed, however perfect the unity of its faith, was weak in its economical joints, and the first storm it encountered made it a wreck.

This storm came with the uprising of 1810 and lasted till 1824, when Mexico and all the possessions of Spain on the American continent became free from Spanish control. This, however, was not the result of the individual colonies acting separately. On the contrary, through union under great leaders they were enabled to present a force that Spain could not resist. After the liberation of Buenos Ayres, San Martin gathered an army at Mendoza, on the eastern slope of the Andes, and crossed the mountains to

support the cause of independence in Chili. Then the combined armies of Buenos Ayres and Chili descended upon the Spanish forces in Peru. At the same time from the north came the army of Bolivar, which had already overrun and liberated New Grenada and Venezuela. On the soil of Peru, the headquarters and center of Spanish power, the two armies were united to put an end to Spanish rule in South America. In the same years in Mexico the war for independence had run its course, and the ancient viceroyalty of New Spain was transformed into the republic of Mexico.

Through this great popular movement, involving all the continental colonies of Spain, a number of independent states came into being, and a number of republics undertook to repeat the experience of the United States. But this successful movement for independence failed to reach Cuba and Porto Rico, and they remained still for three quarters of a century under the dominion of Spain. Their persistent struggle against superior authority indicated that they were moved by the same desires that had led the other colonies to freedom, but that they lacked the power to achieve their independence. The Cubans and Porto Ricans were isolated, and as the Spaniards dominated the sea there was no opportunity for them to form alliances either between the inhabitants of the two islands or with the colonists of the mainland. But in spite of their isolation and the apparently hopeless task before them, the Cubans never put aside their ambition to be free; and it was this ambition that upheld them in the long years of their demoralizing struggle. From every attempt to gain their independence they recoiled defeated and degraded. Whatever measure of civilization they had achieved was imperiled, and the island was wasted under fruitless contention.

From this point of view the recent war appears as the means and occasion for finally severing the bond by which Spain held possessions in America. It completed the work

of emancipation begun in 1810. It closed the most remarkable episode in Spanish history, and one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of the world; an attempt to monopolize on behalf of an illiberal government the settlement and trade of the better part of a continent. It brought to an end the most thoroughgoing system of colonial protection ever constructed.

It was the ideas furnished by the United States that set free Spain's continental colonies, and it was the ideas furnished by the United States, backed by the power of the United States, that enabled the island colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico to sever the bond that bound them to their mother country. In both cases the hand of the United States has contributed largely to Spain's undoing. If there are other causes they are not to be found in a lack of power on the part of Spain to organize, but rather to a failure to conceive and pursue purposes worthy of a nation's activity. For it is difficult to find anywhere in the world a more perfectly organized body of institutions than those created to control the affairs of the Spanish colonies in America. When we consider at how many points they touched the life of the subjects, and with what precision they worked for centuries, it is impossible to withhold our admiration for the genius that brought them into form. It was not on the side of her institutions as a system of social organization that Spain was weak. Her weakness displayed itself in her inability to find and adopt a proper object towards which to direct the operations of her institutions. She invented means that were efficient, but she had no supreme purpose which the nations of progress could permanently approve. Her institutions were carefully wrought out and rigidly determined. They were capable of resisting successfully any shock from the side of the reformers. And her ideals were like her institutions: when once formed and approved, as they were, by the ecclesiastical spirit of the nation, they were conceived as fixed and established as surely as an item of the everlasting

truth. The revelations of thought and the modifications of environment, which change our ideals with every passing year, have left the ideals of the Spaniards essentially unchanged. They have resisted the promptings of the revolutionary spirit, and have consequently lacked the boon that revolution has brought to other nations. Spain has remained behind in the race of European civilization because she never had the intellectual freedom or moral courage to change her ideals, or a sufficiently sweeping revolution to break the rigidity of her institutions.

During this century the English have received unstinted praise for their heroic and unselfish efforts in driving the French from the Spanish peninsula. In view of the fact that our gratitude rises instinctively to him who averts an immediate evil, it was only natural that the world should applaud Wellington and his followers, the first to turn back the conquering armies of Napoleon. But as we see more clearly the great facility the French have displayed in progress since the revolution, and behold what Spain has remained, we may fairly question the wisdom of the Spanish in wishing to be protected from their northern neighbors. What Spain needed then was not peace but revolution. Her ecclesiastical and political institutions, the very spirit of her society stood in the way of progress. More than anything else she needed a brief period of thoroughgoing destruction, in order that afterwards she might develop a modern society on a free field without the hindrance of overpowering conservative traditions. Such a regeneration might have come through the triumph of the French in the early part of this century; for the Napoleonic Empire was the revolution organized. Wherever it went, even into the wastes of benighted Mecklenburg, it carried emancipation and an impulse to a new life. But Spain rejected the revolution, and now, a hundred years later, finds herself ineffectively struggling in the meshes of ecclesiasticism and political privilege.

Considering Spain's condition, considering the inability

of the Spaniards to break the fetters of their traditions, it was not to be expected that they would close the long-continuing conflict with the English people without a final struggle, even though that struggle, to the reasonable mind, seemed to lead only to ruin. Reason is often powerless in the presence of the traditions that determine conduct; and the recent conduct of Spain illustrates how it may be impossible for a nation to break with her traditions, even to hold herself back from the brink of destruction. And this headlong conduct, this rushing on where reason fears to tread, we sometimes in our mistaken judgments admire as a manifestation of high spirit. Once the possessor of the better half of the continent, proud as bearing the inheritance of an heroic past, Spain could not yield to the demands of an upstart nation; and it is impossible to behold her facing her inevitable fate with dazed but steady resistance, without a large measure of feeling akin to admiration. The mother of nations, she has seen her children, one after another, turn against her and defy her authority; and it is only natural that in the bitterness of this last parting she should be moved to a struggle of despair.

But as the agony is finally over, Spain may now find that she has passed the crisis that marks the transition from middle life to old age. Her offspring have either set up establishments for themselves, or have allied themselves with other houses. Her expenses may be reduced, but the savings of the later years by this means have little significance. In the case of a nation, as in the case of an individual person, the important period of life is not the period when the responsibilities have been thrown off and the expense of living has been diminished.

In these years immediately following the war, Spain will have fewer obligations in relation to her resources than before. Hers will be the limited expenses of a household from which the children have departed. The expenses of her navy are greatly diminished, and there is no reason

why they should be increased. It is for Spain to recognize what it is well for every nation to recognize, that unless a navy is fairly able to be a rival of the strongest, it is a more or less useless burden on the nation. Spain has no further need of a navy, and her national existence will be quite as secure without warships as with them. In the future she will stand as other small states stand, by the sufferance of other nations rather than by any power she may possess; and other nations will be quite as likely to recognize her claim without a show of force as with it.

The war has given one more confirmation of the proposition that the tendency observed in economic affairs during the recent decades is also to be realized in political affairs; I mean the tendency to develop larger effective units for practical control. The corporation has, in a large measure, supplanted individual industry and commerce, and the larger corporations are gradually absorbing the smaller, or determining the conditions under which they may exist. The forces that are producing this result are permanent economic forces, and for this reason we may not look for a return to the individualism of earlier industrial life. And the tendency to larger aggregation is not less conspicuous in political than in economic life. Illustrations of this are found everywhere where there is national growth. The small states of the Italian peninsula have been united into the kingdom of Italy; and the petty kingdoms of Germany have been merged into the empire. The partitioning of Africa has not added many new states, has not increased greatly the number of states in the world; but it has increased in a marked degree the territory of existing states. With the advance of Russia, small states lose their individuality, and their territory is brought under the dominion of the great empire. England, in spite of the fact that her possessions encircle the globe, shows no signs of disintegration. The bonds which unite her distant lands are apparently stronger to-day than ever before. The territory of states is increasing as improvements in the facilities for

communication and transportation have rendered political control over large areas easy and free from embarrassing delays. The immediate prospect, therefore, is not of a revival of small states, but of the distribution of the effective political power in the world among a few great nations, nations that will base their claims to exist on their power to preserve the peace of the world and to extend the well-being of mankind. The smaller nations will continue to exist, as Switzerland exists, by the will of their strong neighbors. In this class Spain will find herself as a result of the war, and in this position her ancient ambition will of necessity be laid aside, and an opportunity given her to recover from the moral weakness by which she has been brought to her low estate.

Spain interests the world no more for her international relations. Shorn of her colonial possessions, she will have no occasion to involve herself in foreign quarrels, and other nations are not likely to seek her alliance. No foreign government can hope to derive from her either political wisdom or military power, and without hope of gain in some form, one nation is not usually eager to court the favor of another. The problems, therefore, which Spain has to face are chiefly domestic problems; and the world's interest in them is to observe whether a nation that has been so high and fallen so low can rise again. We are anxious to know if on the trail of the westward movement of progress there must follow the westward movement of national decline. Must the desolation which overwhelmed Assyria and Babylonia follow in the train of the ascending civilization that rises towards the west? As we push the higher phases of civilization westward, we are interested to know if we must be followed by a blight that wastes our achievements behind us.

Spain, in her culture and in her experience, stands nearer the Orient than any other European nation. If, therefore, national decay and death are on the trail of the civilized nations, we might reasonably expect them to

appear first in Spain. If for Spain there is no revival, if she must be wasted as the nations of western Asia have been wasted, then in the process of the centuries other nations may be expected to share in the same fate.

But the significance of the war with Spain is not completely set forth by a narrative of its effects on that nation. If we would comprehend its full import as an historical event, we must know the position in which it has left the United States; we must know to what extent it has modified this nation's prospects; what new problems it has presented, and what new responsibilities it has created.

The war with Spain has revealed us to ourselves as well as to the rest of the world. It has made us think that, in spite of a strong tendency to luxurious living, the nation has not lost its virility. It has shown that in spite of our joy in peace congresses, we are still possessed of a warlike spirit; and that underneath a veneering of cultivation, there remain the uneradicated qualities of the old viking or ancient Germanic warrior.

Without a conscious design on the part of the people to assume unusual burdens, the war between Spain and the United States thrust this nation into a position where it found the gravest responsibilities resting upon it, and where it is compelled by its power, by its pretensions to a high form of civilization, and by its faith in its own ideas of liberty and order, to let its influence be felt to the farthest limit of its opportunity. This policy is not a matter of debate. If what we say of ourselves is true, if there is anything in our political and social ideas that has contributed to our prosperity, then we are the possessors of the ten talents. We are under moral obligations to let the influence of our ideas be felt wherever this may be done without violating the established relations of nations. If the ideas which underlie our civilization have in them the promise of social amelioration, they are the gospel which it is our mission to carry beyond our borders whenever the turns in the fortunes of nations shall open the way. This

policy in its general features is not one on which thoughtful men can be separated into opposing parties. It is a policy that is involved in the higher civilization of a nation; and for what may come to future generations through it, patriotism demands that we should shoulder, like men who are not afraid, the great responsibilities that have descended upon us.

Events whose ultimate consequences no one was able to foresee have determined for the immediate future this nation's career. In fact, events which no one was able to foresee have determined the whole history of this nation. The affirmation of any officer of government as to what will be accomplished by any great movement has no necessary connection with what will be achieved. The individual man expresses his own consciousness and purpose, but the consciousness and purpose of the nation find in his voice no complete expression. The government entered upon the civil war in this country with the expressed intention not to abolish slavery; but the sober judgment of the future historian will set down the abolition of slavery as the great achievement of that awful conflict.

The conflict with Spain has settled beyond all question that this nation must be one of the great powers that, together, will control the destiny of the world in the coming century. And in the assertion of supremacy by a few great states is the only hope of permanent peace and order. When the smaller nations shall have become either absorbed or relegated to positions of virtual dependence, only the great nations among themselves will be able to disturb the peace of the world. These great nations will find peace, with a mutual understanding as to the method of settling difficulties, more advantageous than war; for among the great nations of fifty years hence, or even among the great nations of to-day, war to a finish or to the point of subjugation will be an impossibility. Even to-day, not anticipating the future, a war between the United States and Russia would end essentially where it began. When

the power of these and the other leading nations and their dependencies shall have been fully developed, the world will be at their disposal. There will be for them then no alternative but to revive and adopt the policy of establishing among themselves a balance of powers. What was once a European plan for preserving the peace of Europe, may, with the new prestige of arbitration, be adopted as a means for preserving the peace of the world.

As it regards the United States, the war with Spain is significant in that it has opened to the minds of the people a wider view. Living on a compact territory, removed from the necessity of learning other languages, having little intimate intercourse with foreign nations, we were running the risk of developing a certain form of provincialism. Intent on the excellencies of our government, which none of us will question, we were in danger of becoming uncharitable of the political achievements of other nations, and of developing a political bigotry to stand in our way as Spain's religious bigotry has stood in the way of her progress. As a consequence of recent events we are drawn into a larger sphere. When as a nation we impinge on the world at many points, as individuals we are interested in all of those points; and our interest leads to knowledge, our knowledge to enlarged sympathies, and enlarged sympathies are the essential basis of broad cultivation.

In the forces that extend our horizon and the range of our sympathies will be found an influence to ameliorate our internal affairs. When we have before us the serious questions that will arise through our larger contact with the world, there will of necessity be less littleness in our politics, and statesmen may arise where we now produce politicians. Details of administration will be relegated to their proper position, and remain details, and not be magnified to become issues in a national election campaign.

In the management of the affairs of our country we have shown less administrative than legislative capacity; and this is in part due to the fact that we have been

pioneers in government. We have had a state to plan and construct, and this largely without a model. This constructive work has absorbed our attention. We have passed from the making of one law to the making of another law; and in the meantime the first law has often had no one to execute it. Through the experience of these last years we have been brought into a position where this weakness of our administrative work will become especially manifest. As long as a slack administration of law involved us in no serious inconvenience, we seemed to regard our polities as an affair of a holiday. The circumstances into which we have drifted are likely to give our political activity a serious aspect, and this is a distinct gain. In dealing with our new fellow-citizens, administration will be found to be even more important than legislation. Slack administration here will be something more than an inconvenience. If tolerated, it will be a national disgrace. We are thus happily brought into a position where at least part of our government must be regarded as a serious business, in which we can afford to employ only those who are both honest and wise. This is fortunate, for we shall here have the stimulus of a possible failure. Under this stimulus, under circumstances where much depends on actions of a certain quality, I am persuaded that those actions will be performed. When it is made clear to the American people that much depends on having men of certain qualities in the public service, I am persuaded that men possessing those qualities will be brought to the front. If by the chance of war we have been placed in a position where only heroic efforts, lifting us to a much higher grade of administrative efficiency, will save us from failure and disgrace, I have sufficient confidence in the race to which we belong to be sure that such efforts will be made.

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In the presence of the great national crisis through which this nation is now passing, it is necessary to remember that the conflict from which we have emerged was not brought about by any one man or any living body of men.

It was, as I have already said, a phase of the centuries-old conflict between the English and the Spanish peoples. It was set down long ago in the programme of the movement of civilization. It was involved in the antagonism of social growth and social degeneracy. If we had already fallen into the quiescent decay that marks Spain, this antagonism might not have appeared, and the conflict might have been avoided. But this nation is young and Spain is old. There is little harmony between their ideals, and the passage of time has only intensified their differences, and made more prominent the grounds of actual antagonism.

Perhaps the final and fatal struggle need not have come in this generation, but would it have been better postponed? Here we are left to the imperfect guidance of our individual judgments and whatever of prophetic vision we may possess. We might have remained behind the walls of our isolation till the world had been preëmpted by the representatives of those ideas against which the existence of this nation is a protest. This might have left us in peace to cultivate our cotton and our corn, but with a limited field for the propagation of those ideas of which we claim the world stands in need. If we believe profoundly in ourselves, we must hold that other peoples will be advanced by conforming to the ideals and practices of our life, and that it is one of the functions of this nation to be the missionary of its liberalizing spirit.

At the time of each previous extension of our borders, the movement was regarded by many persons with suspicion and alarm. They fancied in some cases that the end of the republic was at hand. Their evil forebodings filled the length and breadth of the land. For the grave responsibilities we were assuming there was apparently no adequate compensation. But their fears were not realized, and in the course of time they faded away. Opposition to the policy of the government is less vigorous to-day than it was in the earlier cases of annexation; and there is reason to think that it will disappear as completely as the earlier

opposition disappeared. Hitherto every step in our national life towards wider dominion has been a step forward and upward towards greater power and greater dignity. If we have run blindly into our present position, it is not too much to believe that the forces in our race that have thus far made for progress will lead us still, though we may not foresee the way, to the attainment of greater authority and a wider sphere of beneficent influence. Whenever a nation rises by military achievements, extension of territory, or any other means, to greater political importance among the nations of the world, members of foreign nations instinctively ascribe to its learning, literature, and general culture a new and increased importance. And when a nation declines in power and loses its political prestige, there is inevitably a falling off in the world's regard for the higher elements of its civilization. This fact finds its most recent illustration in the change which came over the world's estimate of German learning and culture after the crushing victory over France, and the consolidation of the political power of the empire. Throughout the leading civilized nations, excepting France, persons of cultivation turned with an increasing zeal and in increasing numbers to the study of the German language and literature; the number of foreign students in the German universities increased; and everywhere men were eager to become familiar with the thought and ideals of the German nation. With respect to defeated France, the opposite happened. She not only lost her military and political prestige, but at the same time her learning was despised, and her cultivation was rejected as shallow and frivolous. Yet once French civilization had dominated Europe, but this was at the time when by her power she held a commanding position in political affairs. Another illustration of this idea is found in the increased estimation in which the intellectual achievements of Italy are held since the accomplishment of her great work in behalf of national unity. Applying this thought to the United States, we behold in our expanded power and

prestige a means of making our ideas current in the world. It may be true that within the limits of our ancient territory we have the means of accumulating all the wealth we need. It may be true that we have no need of much that the Orient may teach; but it is not to be supposed that the last thousand years of Oriental experience is entirely without profitable lessons for even the American nation. As the neighbor of the Chinese in the Orient, it is to be hoped that this nation may acquire somewhat of their respect for form, to ornament the strong and healthful manifestation of our spirit. If, as it regards our cultivation, or spiritual life, we have little need of the Orient, the Orient has need of us. Charity, a proper recognition of human worth, regard for woman, a determination to let justice rule, political liberty: these are some of the achievements of our race, some of the positive results of a long course of social development. Of these the Orient has need. They may be accepted by any nation without doing violence to the race ideas on which the civilization of that nation rests; and in carrying these principles of a higher civilization to the islanders of the Pacific, there is a certain excuse for our zeal, and a compensation for our responsibilities. These and other ideas for which our society stands are assumed to be worth the effort it costs to realize them in life; for it is assumed that in them is the seed of a higher civilization. That these ideas may be carried forward for the betterment of the less advanced portions of the human race, is a certain justification of the power and dominion held by the nations of English stock. Wherever the dominion of any branch of the English people has established itself hitherto a higher and progressive form of civilization has been instituted. This fact gives ground for the expectation that the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands will ultimately derive advantage from being brought under the sovereignty of the United States. One of the important items in this advantage will consist in the fact that ultimately these islanders, if they justify the most hopeful thoughts concerning them, will

with such limitations of suffrage as may seem expedient, have part in a great federal government, whose traditions are the traditions of freedom and toleration, and whose power will be sufficient to establish security and peace as the conditions of progress and prosperity; for the federal government is the only form of government under which widely separated communities, individually incapable of defending themselves against the machinations of great states, can be rendered secure in the enjoyment of the advantages of power and liberty. In the words of President Schurman, of the United States Philippine Commission, "our tutelage, at least for some time, is the only thing that can save the Filipinos from despotism and anarchy, and their islands from a division among the European powers, thus destroying forever the hope of a free and self-governing Filipino nationality." Under the sovereignty of the federal republic of the United States, the way is open to these islanders to become self-governing communities; and, if their development will justify it, to become, through representatives, participants in the larger affairs of the national government. Under the sovereignty of the United States, the power of the United States is in their service, to preserve internal peace and to ward off the invader; thus making possible the two most important immediate aims of social ambition, namely, the achievement of great power and the preservation of liberty. In view of the tendency to enlarge the extent of the dominion of modern states, the principle of federal organization is the most effective and the most fruitful political principle of the present age. It enables the weak to share in the advantages of power. It stimulates the less advanced of the communities thus linked together to aspire to the standards of the higher. It assures freedom in all efforts that make for the higher civilization, and causes a heavy hand to be felt only where the movement is towards barbarism. It provides a way by which the dependency may rise to practical independence without revolution. Its efficiency in furnishing a method for

governing communities too widely extended for even imperial rule is emphasized by the existence of a widely entertained opinion that England's vast and varied possessions must gradually draw themselves together into the bonds of a federal union. In order to bring our influence to bear in an effective manner on Hawaii or the Philippines, it is not necessary that we should follow England as an ultimate model; on the contrary, if we make wise use of our means and our opportunities, England may find it advisable before long, in impressing upon her varied possessions the ideas of unity and nationality, to adopt the principle of federalism, and follow the lead of the federal republic of the United States.

It has been affirmed that our miserable governmental conduct in Alaska is a sufficient reason why we should never again put our hand to a similar task. Carrying this thought to its logical consequence, we might have concluded some time ago that because the school board of San Francisco appeared to be desperately corrupt, therefore we should never again attempt to maintain schools in our large cities by governmental authority. This affirms too much. Because there are weak places in our government, shall we withdraw from attempts to govern at those points? Shall we confess that our government cannot do what it ought to do, or what other governments with high ideals can do? The doing of difficult things offers the best means to acquire power and facility. English political life in the eighteenth century was mean, corrupt, and ineffective, but under the difficult tasks of the later decades, under the inspiration of the larger ideas that came with the development of her power and the extension of her dominion, the English nation has risen to be more widely influential than any other nation in spreading over the world the blessings of good government and the prospects of a higher form of social life. And there is no reason to doubt that, under a like stimulus, the American branch of the English people may have at least an equally beneficent influence; and that

along the lines of political supremacy it will carry the ideas born of our broader experience and our freer life, to establish, wherever the Americans dominate, the basis of a better social existence.





